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This paper discusses the banking regulatory and supervisory practices in People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) with reference to the international standard for banking supervision, namely, 
the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs). While the  PRC has 
incorporated many sound practices advocated by the BCPs, there are quite a few areas 
where significant differences can be observed with respect to qualification review of senior 
management, broader regulation at the product level, prescriptive rules, and guidance for 
risk management. Broadly speaking, the PRC adopts a rules-based approach to regulation; 
in many cases, regulations are prescriptive or even intrusive. In building a robust supervisory 
system, the PRC finds specific guidance more helpful than sole reliance on principles-based 
approaches. 
The paper argues that general principles and a principle-based approach to regulation do 
not seem to work well for emerging markets.  Indeed, the current financial crisis has 
revealed some shortcomings in the existing international standards on banking supervision. 
Perhaps this standard can be improved by greater specificity and by incorporating more 
aspects of the experiences in emerging markets. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter  discusses the banking regulatory and supervisory practices in People’s 
Republic of China (PRC)  with reference to the international standard for banking 
supervision, namely, the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs).
1
The findings presented here  are intended to further enhance the  understanding of the 
international standard on banking supervision as well as its  implementation in emerging 
markets.  Based on this analysis, I argue that general principles and a principle-based 
approach to regulation do not seem to work well for emerging markets.  Indeed, the current 
financial crisis has revealed some shortcomings in the existing international standards on 
banking supervision. Perhaps this standard can be improved by greater specificity and by 
incorporating more aspects of the experiences in emerging markets.  
 
While PRC has incorporated many sound practices advocated by the BCPs, there are quite 
a few areas where significant differences can be observed with respect to  qualification 
review of senior management, broader regulation at the product level, prescriptive rules, and 
guidance for risk management. 
2.  BANKING SECTOR REFORM IN PRC  
Banking sector reform is the most important part of financial sector reform in PRC. It started 
as early as 1978, when the monobank system was replaced with a multilayered system that 
separates commercial lending operations and central banking. However, the most recent 
major reform initiatives to improve the functioning of the banking sector and banking 
regulatory system started in late 2003 when, after the success in corporate sector reform, 
the government decided to recapitalize all the state-owned banks and establish the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CRBC), which is devoted exclusively to regulation and 
supervision of the banking industry. By this time, PRC  had completed the process of 
introducing an institutional approach  to financial regulation while the central bank, the 
People’s Bank of China, continued to be responsible for monetary policy.   
The CBRC is fully committed to building up a strong and robust banking sector and an 
effective supervisory system. The bank restructuring over the years has been successful. At 
present the entire banking sector has restored its solvency,  and banks have become 
financially sound and better managed financial institutions. A comparison of data from 2003 
to 2008 reveals the remarkable change in the financial strength and resilience of the banking 
industry. Over this period, the total assets have increased by CNY 34.7 trillion, up 1.3 times; 
bank capital has increased by CNY 2.72 trillion, up 2.6 times; and profits have increased by 
CNY 521.8 billion, up 17 times. The nonperforming loan ratio of major commercial banks 
was reduced by 15.5 percentage points, while the number of banks in compliance with the 
minimum capital requirement of 8%  has increased from eight  to 204, with their assets 
accounting for 99.9% of the total banking assets. The average capital adequacy ratio is 12% 
for all commercial banks.  
On the regulatory and supervisory side, ever since its establishment, the CBRC has 
benchmarked to international standards and sound practices in banking supervision and has 
worked hard to develop a clear roadmap for the future. In its early days, the CBRC provided 
significant inputs into the drafting of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Banking 
Regulation and Supervision (hereafter referred to as the Law), which was issued shortly 
after the CBRC began  operation in late 2003.  While recommending the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Supervision as the most relevant framework for banking supervision, 
                                                 
1 See Appendix. ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
2 
the CBRC helped to ensure that the Law clearly defines not only the objectives of banking 
supervision  and the  responsibilities of the banking supervisor but also the detailed 
approaches to banking supervision. Indeed, over 50%  of the provisions  under  the Law 
closely reflect various principles of the BCPs document.
2 Moreover, the BCPs document is 
included as an appendix in the interpretation notes of the above Law, together with other 
relevant rules and regulations issued by the government, which is rather unprecedented in 
the rule-making process in PRC.
3
Although the BCPs have helped to shape in a very significant way the banking regulatory 
framework in PRC, there are quite a few areas where the regulatory and supervisory 
practices in PRC differ from the supervisory practices as endorsed by the BCPs.   
  
Generally speaking, principles stand for a basic or general truth. Specifically, “the Core 
Principles are a framework of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices and are 
considered universally applicable. …The Core Principles are neutral with regard to different 
approaches to supervision, so long as the overriding goals are achieved.”
4
Such an approach has been well defined by the United Kingdom (UK) Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). In 2007 the FSA states in its report that “principles-based regulation means, 
where possible, moving away from dictating through detailed, prescriptive rules and 
supervisory actions how firms should operate their business. We want to give firms the 
responsibility to decide how best to align their business objectives and processes with the 
regulatory outcomes we have specified.”
  Throughout the 
BCPs document, many principles are defined in very general terms. Indeed, many principles 
are phrased in such a way that they are close to the principles defined by the U.K. regulators 
in spirit, namely, a principle-based approach to regulation.  
5
3.  REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES IN PRC 
 In contrast to the UK and, more broadly speaking, 
some other highly developed markets, supervisors in emerging markets continue to share a 
preference for adopting specific rules and regulations. PRC’s approach to regulation and 
supervisor provides an example that clearly suggests that a rules-based approach is the 
most appropriate way to go for emerging markets for now and in the future.  
Discussed below are some differences between the supervisory practices in PRC and sound 
practices advocated by the BCPs. The discussion follows the BCPs’ framework for the sake 
of convenience and is intended to shed light on  how international standards can be 
improved by incorporating more of the experiences from emerging markets.  
3.1  Objectives, Independence, Powers, Transparency and 
Cooperation (Principle 1)  
The objectives of banking supervision and powers of the supervisors are very important, and 
more often than not they are defined by the law. For emerging markets such as PRC, these 
issues must be made clear and specific. In the BCPs document, principle 1 states at the 
outset that “an effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and 
objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks.”
6
                                                 
2 The Law contains six chapters and fifty provisions.  
 Here  the principle 1 
focuses on the clarity of the responsibility and objectives of supervisory agencies and is 
silent on the specific objectives of banking supervision. In contrast, the 1997 version clearly 
3 People’s Republic of China (2004). 
4 Basel Committee (2006a). 
5 FSA (2007). 
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identifies the objectives of banking supervision: “The key objective of supervision is to 
maintain stability and confidence in the financial system, thereby reducing the risk of loss to 
depositors and other creditors.”
7
As a fundamental issue, the objectives of banking supervision should be clearly defined in 
specific terms for supervisors in all countries. In practice, a specific definition of objectives 
will help each authority involved in banking  supervision to better define its role and 
responsibilities. In the law governing banking supervision in PRC, it is stated clearly at the 
outset that the objective of banking supervision is to protect the interests of depositors and 
other consumers. As PRC follows an institutional approach to regulating different sectors of 
the  financial services industry, these objectives are critical as they  provide clarity and a 
sense of purpose for the CBRC, as the sole government agency authorized for the pursuit of 
these objectives.  
 
In reality, it could happen that a supervisory agency might define its responsibilities and 
objectives so as to simply justify its existence. In some countries, several supervisors are 
involved in banking supervision, and they all have a set of responsibilities and objectives, but 
this  does  not necessarily contribute to  effective supervision  and  partly explains why  an 
overview of world implementation of the  BCPs  indicates  that compliance with this 
component of principle 1 is close to 90%, almost the highest level among all the principles 
(International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank 2002). Therefore, it could be concluded 
that  the  revised  statement “an effective system of banking supervision will have clear 
responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks” is still 
too general to be considered a minimum standard (see Appendix). Ideally, the guidance on 
the issue should be as specific as possible by listing a number of commonly agreed 
objectives, such as protection of the interest of depositors and consumers, and ensuring the 
stability the banking system. Indeed, recently, following the current financial crisis, 
governments in a number of countries stated publicly that all bank deposits would be safe or 
that deposit insurance coverage would be unlimited. These actions were successful in 
avoiding  retail bank runs and highlighted the importance of protection of depositors in 
maintaining financial stability. Given these developments, there is good reason to suggest 
that the BCPs need to be more specific with the objectives of banking supervision. The 
silence regarding  the overall objectives of banking supervision may  well  be  a way to 
accommodate differing  national practices,  but it also indicates a more principles-based 
approach to supervision, a characteristic that becomes increasingly evident in a number of 
principles concerning risk management.   
3.2  Licensing and Structure (Principles 2–5) 
The entire supervisory cycle starts with the definition of banks and permissible activities of 
banking institutions. It is in these areas where significant differences can be seen between 
PRC’s approach and the practices endorsed by the BCPs document. In the BCPs, four 
principles relate to the permissible activities of banks, authorization of banking 
establishments,  prior regulatory approval for transfer of significant ownership,  and major 
acquisitions. The BCPs clearly state that the permissible activities of banks must be clearly 
defined, without suggesting whether there is any need for further regulation. This may well 
be typical of the general practices in developed markets, where “product regulation” does 
not exist.  
For example, the UK FSA has been reluctant to accept the idea that it should regulate 
products in either retail or wholesale markets. Its regulatory philosophy is based on the 
following set of assumptions. First, firms must be subject to prudential regulation to ensure 
financial soundness. Second, firms must be subject to business  conduct  regulation, 
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including regulation of sales practices, to ensure that customers are treated fairly and are 
well informed. And finally, product regulation is not required because well-managed firms will 
not develop products that are excessively risky, and because well-informed customers will 
only choose products that serve their needs.
8
In contrast, the Law on Banking Regulation and Supervision in PRC states that the banking 
supervisor is empowered to determine the business scope of banks (that is, permissible 
activities). Based on the Law, the CBRC has issued a set of detailed procedures governing 
the review of permissible activities. Under these procedures, banks need to have prior 
supervisory approval for all new products or services,  such  as  foreign exchange 
transactions, issue of subordinated debt, derivative transactions, asset management, 
custodian services for investment funds, and offshore banking transactions. Moreover, any 
new activities that  are not defined by the current regulations also will be subject to 
supervisory approval as specified in the future by the supervisor. Another example lies in 
how problems related to securitization are addressed: the CBRC recently ruled that banks 
should never use low-quality assets as underlying assets for securitization.  
  
While the CBRC recognizes that such approval processes may have the potential to slow 
the pace of financial innovation, the supervisor strongly believes that such an approach does 
help to reduce the business risks of banks—particularly those that do not have sound risk 
management procedures and processes—and thus contributes to the system’s stability.  
It is interesting to note that supervisors in some developed markets  also  have come to 
recognize that “financial innovations can sometimes achieve economic rent extraction, rather 
than delivering valuable customer and economic benefits  …contributing significantly to 
increased systemic risk.”
9
3.3  Prudential Regulation and Requirements (Principles 6–18) 
 One implication is that regulators may well need to consider the 
direct regulation of products at both the retail and wholesale level. This development is worth 
noting in the update of international guidance on banking supervision.   
Development of prudential rules and regulations as well as their implementation represent a 
large part of a  supervisor’s day-to-day activities. Among all supervisory tasks, capital 
regulation is the most important. There seems to be general agreement among emerging 
markets that as it stands now, principle 6 on capital regulation is too general to be really 
helpful in that it falls short in endorsing the Basel Accord of 1988 (Basel I) as the 
international standard for capital regulation, let alone the Basel Accord of 2004 (Basel II). 
Promoting international convergence for capital regulation has been the focus of the Basel 
Committee from the late 1980s to the present, with an emphasis on strengthening capital 
requirements for securitization and trading book exposures. In addition, the reference to 
“internationally active banks” in principle 6 remains unclear and further narrows the scope of 
application  for  “the applicable Basel requirement.”  The president of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank recognized the same issue recently when he stated, “The main achievements 
of the first Basel Capital Accord were that it represented a significant step towards 
international harmonization of banking regulation—it was later applied by more than 100 
countries.”
10
Furthermore, according to one  survey  of non–Basel Committee countries, out of 115 
jurisdictions in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe, 95 
are currently planning to implement Basel II.
  
11
                                                 
8 FSA (2009). 
 It is a bit difficult to understand why the  Basel 
Accord has not been duly recognized in the BCPs—of course, with necessary modification—
9 FSA (2009). 
10 Weber (2009). 
11 Financial Stability Institute (2008). ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
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as the de facto capital standard in light of its widespread adoption and clear support by 
some Group of Ten supervisors as well.  
Current capital regulation in PRC is based largely on a modified version of Basel I with some 
elements of Basel II, replacing the club approach of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development with a more sensible alternative. By the end of 2008, the 
average capital of banks in PRC is 12%, with 82% of the regulatory capital being tier 1, 
without allowing for innovative capital instruments one way or another. In fact, the supervisor 
did not consider inclusion of short-term subordinated debt as tier 3 capital since such an 
approach intuitively does not make any sense given its very limited power to absorb losses 
resulting from the trading book (in addition to the lack of such instruments in the market).   
Furthermore, in contrast to Basel I, the current capital rule does not place any constraint on 
the amount of provisions that may count as part of capital. Given that general provisions are 
not tax deductible and no different than retained earnings, they are included in tier 1 capital 
rather than tier 2 capital and, more important, subject to no limit. This approach has gained 
more acceptance nowadays. Recently, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) noted that the 
Basel Committee should consider the allocation of general provisions in banks’ regulatory 
capital and examine whether the removal or modification of the caps that limit the amount of 
provisions that may count as capital is warranted.
12
The FSB also suggested that the Basel Committee should further enhance capital regulation 
by making it more risk sensitive and by raising the quality, consistency, and transparency 
standards for the capital base, as well as introducing a leverage ratio, a minimum global 
standard for funding liquidity ratio, and a framework for countercyclical capital buffers.
  
13
All supervisors agree that capital regulation is not a panacea; sound risk management is just 
as important. The BCPs document is right in devoting a large share of its content—namely, 
principles 7 to 16—to guidance on risk management, covering credit risk, market risk, 
liquidity risk, operational risk, and interest rate risk on banking book. By stressing that banks 
and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process for all 
material risks,  subject to supervisors’ satisfaction, the BCPs again demonstrate a clear 
preference for a principle-based approach to supervision.  
 
Many of these issues will need to be harmonized internationally. As the role of capital has 
become increasingly important following the current financial crisis, the international 
supervisory community may need to revisit the international guidance on capital regulation 
as presented in principle 6.  
As discussed earlier, PRC’s approach is rules based and in most cases is prescriptive and 
even intrusive, covering not only licensing but also all risk management related issues. 
Indeed, there are no general principles in PRC governing banking supervision, although the 
idea of a principles-based approach has been adopted in a limited way for licensing 
requirements for innovative financial products only.
14
                                                 
12 FSB (2009). 
 In some cases, the risk management 
rules and regulations are highly prescriptive, yet they are well accepted by the industry. For 
example, a set of rules governing bank financing of fixed asset investments was recently 
issued and went into effect as of November 2009. The rules provide specific guidance on 
processing of loan requirements, loan evaluation, signing of contracts, disbursement of loan 
proceeds,  and loan monitoring after disbursement. One provision is so specific that it 
requires that all disbursement of loan proceeds over 5% of the investment, regardless of the 
size of investment,  or higher than  CNY  5  million  be wired by banks directly to service 
providers instead of to the borrowers as the beneficiary. The rationale for such a specific 
approach is to help strengthen banks’ credit risk management in addition to addressing the 
13 FSB (2009). 
14 The Principles on Loan Classification, issued in 1998 and revised subsequently, are basically very specific 
rules governing banks’ practice for valuation of loans rather than a set of general principles.  ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
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immediate concern of using loan  proceeds for purposes outside the loan covenants. 
Noncompliance will result in supervisory sanctions. The feedback from the industry so far 
has been positive.  
Undoubtedly, one of the weaknesses of a principles-based approach is that it makes the 
assessment of compliance rather subjective and difficult,  both at the  national and 
international level. Indeed,  “experience has already shown that the Principles may be 
interpreted in widely diverging ways, and incorrect interpretations may result in 
inconsistencies among assessments.”
15 With this in mind, the Basel Committee  at its 
October 1998 meeting took the initiative to have a document prepared for use in compliance 
assessments. This document, The Core Principles Methodology, introduces a more rules-
based approach to assessing the  effectiveness of banking supervision, providing more 
specificity and partly addressing the weakness of the principle-based approach in the main 
document. This shift in the approach to supervision can be seen mostly clearly in essential 
criterion 10,  relating to principle 7,  which requires that “the supervisor issues standards 
related to, in particular, credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, interest risk in the banking book 
and operational risk.”
16
A set of clear rules has always been important for emerging markets. As far as PRC is 
concerned, the very starting point is for the supervisor to issue rules and guidance for all 
material risks, and then check banks’ compliance as the next step,  so as to ensure 
compliance with the rules, both in spirit and to the letter. In light of the lessons learned from 
the current financial crisis, a global trend has begun toward establishing regulation that is 
more prescriptive and intrusive.  This  will have implications for the approach to banking 
supervision when the time comes for updating the international guidelines.  
  
This shift in emphasis is occurring in some developed markets as well. For example, 
The UK FSA’s regulatory and supervisory approach, before the current crisis, 
was based on a sometimes implicit but at times quite overt philosophy which 
believed . . . that the primary responsibility for managing risks lies with the 
senior management and boards of the individual firms, who are better 
placed to assess business model risk than bank regulators and who can be 
replied on to make appropriate decisions about the balance between risks 
and return.
17
However, the FSA’s new approach is significantly different and underpinned by a different 
philosophy of regulation. This new approach is more intrusive than before, to say the least.  
 
Another important concept of the  BCPs, one that runs  through the entire document,  is 
proportionality. This concept first appears in principle 7 with the reference that “these [risk 
management]  processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the 
institution.” This concept is extremely relevant for PRC’s banking sector. To some extent, the 
current banking sector is a reflection of a dual economy where the level of development 
between various regions, sectors,  and industries diverges significantly. In such a dual 
banking sector, almost all large banks are publicly listed and are aggressively introducing 
sophisticated statistical analytical tools for risk management, while many small banks are 
still having difficulty  establishing  traditional risk management procedures and processes. 
Against this background, the enforcement of supervisory rules naturally  has to be 
differentiated or proportionate. In fact, a differentiated supervisory approach or the use of the 
proportionality concept (分类监管  or  fen lei jian guan—different supervisory treatment of 
different banking institutions) has been very popular among supervisors,  and previously, 
separate rules were even issued to accommodate financial and operational differences 
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16 Basel Committee (1999).  
17 FSA (2009). ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
7 
among banks depending on their status of incorporation, that is,  foreign, state-owned, 
shareholding, or city commercial banks. It is until quite recently the supervisor had clearly 
indicated that there should be a uniform set of rules applicable to all banks, irrespective of 
incorporation and other factors.  Increasingly more and more rules and regulations have 
converged to cover the entire banking sector while only the rural credit cooperative sector 
remains largely under a different set of rules, given its sector challenges and target client 
group.  The concept of proportionality  is revisited in the conclusion with regard to 
international assessments of compliance.  
3.4  Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision (Principles 19–21) 
Among  both emerging and developed markets  there is a lot of commonality in the way 
supervisors conduct both on-site and off-site supervision.  This may be attributed to the 
nature of banking supervision, namely, the need to enforce rules and check compliance. 
Principle 20 states that “an effective banking supervisory system should consist of on-site 
and off-site supervision” and also requires specifically that the supervisor keep “regular 
contacts with bank management.” The language of this principle is a big improvement over 
the previous version, namely, “an effective supervision should consist of some form of both 
on-site and off-site supervision.” The earlier version  does not give due weight to on-site 
examination by supervisors in order to accommodate the practices  of some highly 
developed markets.  
While maintaining regular contacts may well be an important issue for some developed 
markets, it does not appear to be so important as to constitute part of an international 
standard for banking supervision. In PRC the banking supervisor expects to have regular 
contact with management since such  an arrangement  is  clearly  embedded in the 
supervisory process. As a general practice, the supervisor calls for regular meetings with 
banks on general supervisory issues, and at least once a year, there are tripartite meetings 
among supervisors, banks,  and external auditors as well as  meetings with the board 
members and supervisory board members. Under the rules-based system in PRC, lack of 
regular contact with banks is totally out of question.  
Interestingly enough, one of the lessons from the current financial situation is that 
supervisors should seriously address the lack of regular contact with bank management. 
Such “light-touch” supervision is a factor in the problems associated with some developed 
markets. Going forward, the right approach is probably to balance the practices in emerging 
markets and developed markets so that “regular contact” is treated as an essential criterion 
and thus receives the emphasis it deserves.  
3.5  Accounting and Disclosure (Principle 22)  
PRC’s experience supports the view of the assessors that principles on loan classification 
and provisioning should be complemented with more precise guidelines on loan evaluation, 
income recognition, collateral valuation, establishment of loan loss allowances, and credit 
risk disclosure.
18
                                                 
18 IMF and World Bank (2002). 
 This issue has gained attention following the adoption of international 
accounting standards. Recently, the revision of international accounting standards by the 
International Accounting Standards Board has reflected, to a large extent, the concerns of 
banking supervisors. However, although the revised asset impairment rules are likely closer 
to the expected loss concept advocated by supervisors, these accounting rules still fall short 
of supervisors’ expectations because of the differences between the accounting profession 
and prudential regulation. Therefore, there is a great need for more and specific supervisory ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
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guidance on loan loss provisioning to encourage banks to recognize losses as early as 
possible and to provision sufficiently for loan losses.  
At the present, the most urgent task for the supervisor in PRC is to ensure that banks build 
up their provisions and reserves in good times so as to strengthen the resilience of the 
individual banks and the banking system in general. Such an initiative was introduced last 
year when banks had reported high profits and low levels of nonperforming loans. However, 
before a more rules-based system is put in place—such as the Spanish dynamic 
provisioning system supported by a powerful database of bank loss experience—the 
supervisor in PRC  exercises discretion and judgment in urging banks to build strong 
provisions buffers. Taking into account the average loss of around 75% for nonperforming 
loans disposed by asset management corporations, the supervisor has asked banks to 
increase the provisioning coverage ratio. From a 2009 value of 130%, the ratio is expected 
to reach 150%  by the end of 2010, reflecting both forward-looking and countercyclical 
considerations, even though the underlying supervisory provisioning rules remain 
unchanged.  Clearly, more specific guidance from the international supervisory community 
would help national supervisors in further strengthening their provisioning policies, especially 
given the need to develop a set of countercyclical supervisory standards covering both 
capital and provisions. Standard setters should give due consideration to alternative 
approaches to recognizing and measuring loan losses that incorporate a broader range of 
available credit information, including a fair value model, an expected loss model, and 
dynamic provisioning.
19
3.6  Corrective and Remedial Powers of Supervisors (Principle 23) 
 However, an expected loss model and dynamic provisioning are 
extremely data intensive and may prove to be quite difficult for emerging markets, while a 
fair value model can hardly be an option for the foreseeable future. The overall direction is 
rather clear: provisions for loan losses should cover estimated loan losses that have been 
identified for individual loans, as well as estimated losses for loans in a company’s portfolio 
that have likely been incurred but not yet been individually identified. Estimation  of loan 
losses that have not yet been individually identified is a subjective process and therefore 
requires judgment. Such judgment factors could include changes in relevant economic and 
environmental trends, lending policies and procedures, and changes related to new loan 
segments and products. It is advisable to stress the importance of exercising supervisory 
judgment in light of the market conditions for emerging markets rather than emphasizing  
As stated in principle 23, “Supervisors must have at their disposal an adequate range of 
supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective actions.” The guidance from the BCPs is 
very definitive in this regard and to some extent supports at least some form of product 
regulation,  as referred to in the discussion of the permissible activities of banks. Such 
supervisory actions include “restricting the current activities of the banks, withholding 
approval of new activities or acquisitions and restricting or suspending payments to 
shareholders.”
20
                                                 
19 Financial Stability Forum (2009). 
 Supervisory practice in PRC  confirms the importance of taking  various 
supervisory actions, and again, the supervisor in PRC is in a much better position to do so 
as it is prescribed by the Law as part of the authorization process for new products. This 
approach complements other supervisory sanctions, making another useful weapon readily 
available to the banking supervisor. Therefore, there may be a need to recognize at the 
global level that approval of new activities, in addition to approval of acquisitions,  is 
important, be it part of the authorization process or part of the corrective actions that the 
supervisor may have at his or her disposal.  
20 Basel Committee (2006a). ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
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3.7  Consolidated and Cross-Border Banking Supervision 
(Principles 24–25) 
Consolidated supervision is clearly set to a high standard. It does not come as a surprise 
that many emerging markets would show weak compliance in this area, as shown the IMF’s 
2002 report.
21
On the cross-border issue, principle 25 states, “Banking supervisors must require the local 
operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as those required of 
domestic institutions.” Of course, the legal responsibilities of national supervisors will remain 
unchanged with respect to the regulation of their domestic institutions or the arrangements 
for consolidated supervision already put in place globally. However, this statement does not 
seem to recognize the differences in national supervision due to institutional, historical, legal, 
or other factors, and as a result, it may not actually work in the best interests of emerging 
markets.  
 Similar to other emerging markets, PRC has just recently issued a set of rules 
governing consolidated supervision. Enforcement of these rules will take time as it is both a 
challenge for banks to manage their operations on a consolidated basis and for the 
supervisor to conduct consolidated supervision, covering all aspects of the business 
conducted by the banking group worldwide.  
In terms of the compliance record, the gap between developed and emerging markets  can 
be, not surprisingly, quite significant.
22 Although a supervisor in an emerging market may 
require local operations of foreign banks from developed markets to conform to the same 
standards as apply to domestic institutions, these foreign banks are likely subject to a set of 
less robust standards than they would be in their home country. This will remain a reality as 
long as differences in supervision exist between developed and emerging markets. Perhaps, 
the language of principle 25 is better viewed as a reference to the policy direction or, more 
accurately, an endgame result where, in the distant future, both developed and emerging 
markets will have equally robust supervisory systems. Perhaps a more balanced approach is 
to state that the supervisor should expect foreign banks to be subject to both the standards 
of the home supervisor and the standards of the host supervisor, particularly when the latter 
is considered less robust. Alternatively, the principle  could  directly  refer to the source 
documents by stating that “all international banking groups and international banks should 
be supervised by a home country authority that capably performs consolidated supervision,” 
or that the supervisors should ensure “that all cross-border banking operations are subject to 
effective home and host supervision.”
23
PRC’s experience also supports this argument. The country began to open up its banking 
sector to other countries in 1979 and committed itself in 2001 to removing all geographic and 
customer restrictions on foreign banks. However, as far as the prudential regulatory 
framework is concerned, the loan classification rules were issued in 1998 while the provision 
policy was introduced 2002, and a well-defined capital standard was not made available until 
2004. In this context, a requirement to subject foreign banks to a set of less robust rules 
does not seem to be in the interest of foreign banks, for the sake of sound banking practice. 
In fact, the idea underlying an open policy for PRC and for its banking sector in particular is 
to leverage the expertise of foreign banks to improve the operations of the local banking 
market and the local supervisory system as well. At the present, while the supervisor is 
committed to a set of uniform rules applicable to all banking institutions, rules governing 
foreign banks continue to differ from those governing local banks in certain aspects. Despite 
increasing  local incorporation of foreign banks and  subsidiarization  in PRC, one can not 
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22 IMF and World Bank (2002). 
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overlook the role of the home supervisor, especially in light of the implementation of Basel II 
on a consolidated basis, which has yet to be introduced in PRC.  
One last point relates to financial deregulation and the desirable business model for 
commercial banks. Many people, both in government and academia, strongly believe that 
the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act fueled the crisis. The Glass-Steagall Act was introduced in 
the United States in 1933 as a response to the unsound banking practices and public anger 
after  the stock market crash in 1929. The act prohibited commercial banks from 
underwriting, holding,  or dealing in corporate securities,  either directly or through their 
subsidiaries in the  securities industry. Glass-Steagall  had a significant impact on the 
business model of financial institutions and the regulation of banks, both in the United States 
and in other countries, including PRC.  
At the present, despite some enhancements to Basel II, there has been strong resistance to 
shifting from universal banking to narrow banking. It is the view of some major developed 
markets that large complex banks providing a wide range of activities will remain a feature of 
today’s world financial system. Therefore, it does not seem at all practical to work on the 
assumption that there can or should be complete institutional separation of utility banking 
and investment banking. 
In full recognition of the desire of the developed markets to maintain the status quo of 
universal banking and its  related regulatory framework, the supervisor in PRC  has no 
intention of repeating the same process of deregulation that occurred in some developed 
markets. Instead, the presence of firewalls will effect a clear separation between operations 
basically engaged in commercial banking and those that perform investment banking 
activities. Such a regulatory distinction has served PRC well in preventing the contagion of 
risks between the banking and capital markets. Experience has shown that the erosion of 
these firewalls will likely expose the banking sector to the irrationality of capital markets, to 
the detriment of the depositors that supervisors are supposed to protect in the first place as 
a legal obligation. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
As an emerging market, PRC  has used international standards such as the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision as a benchmark to improve the effectiveness of 
banking supervision. The BCPs document has played a significant role in shaping the 
regulatory framework in PRC. While PRC has incorporated many sound practices endorsed 
by the BCPs, there are still quite a few significant differences.   
Broadly speaking, PRC  adopts a rules-based approach to regulation;  in many cases, 
regulations are prescriptive or even intrusive. In building a robust supervisory system, PRC 
finds specific guidance more helpful than sole reliance on principles-based approaches.  
Adherence to international standards is an important agenda item globally. At present, the 
Financial Stability Board is working hard to promote a race to the top in standards 
implementation, with FSB members leading by example in disclosing their degree of 
compliance with these standards. PRC’s banking supervisor has conducted a self-
assessment of the implementation of the BCPs every two years since 2003. The third self-
assessment in 2007 was performed using the BCPs of 2006.
24
The IMF–World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program is expected to evaluate PRC 
soon. Without any intention to preempt the result of the forthcoming FSAP, perhaps one can 
expect that PRC’s compliance with international standards on banking supervision, which is 
an essential part of the FSAP, will be similar to its Asian peers and presumably below that of 
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many developed markets. However, PRC’s banking supervisory system has ensured the 
safety and soundness of the individual banks and the banking system in PRC, which is the 
basic objective of successful and effective banking regulation and supervision.  
International financial institutions have assessed countries’ compliance with the BCPs either 
on a stand-alone basis or increasingly as part of  the  FSAP. Based on their extensive 
experience, it is easy for assessors to formulate an overall view of a country’s compliance 
with relevant international standards. However, the challenge is to formulate a clear view as 
to what level of compliance or effectiveness of banking supervision would be most 
appropriate for a given country in light of that country’s particular circumstances, such as the 
level of development, sophistication of the banking system, and institutional capacity of the 
supervisor. In essence, this relates basically to the concept of proportionality. On one hand, 
given the gaps and weaknesses of the supervisory system, emerging markets need to 
continue improving the effectiveness of banking supervision. On the other hand, despite an 
impressive compliance record, some developed markets, as the center of the international 
financial system, may need to do more in order to close gaps revealed by the current 
financial crisis so as to improve the effectiveness of  banking supervision beyond mere 
compliance with the international standards. The extent of supervisory actions should be in 
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APPENDIX: BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE 
BANKING SUPERVISION 
The following is taken from The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basel 
Committee 2006a).  
 
Principle 1—Objectives, Independence, Powers, Transparency, and Cooperation 
An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and objectives for 
each authority involved in the supervision of banks. Each such authority should possess 
operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate 
resources, and be accountable for the discharge of its duties. A suitable legal framework for 
banking supervision is also necessary, including  provisions relating to authorization of 
banking establishments and their ongoing supervision; powers to address compliance with 
laws as well as safety and soundness concerns; and legal protection for supervisors. 
Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality 
of such information should be in place.  
 
Principle 2—Permissible Activities 
The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as 
banks must be clearly defined, and the use of the word “bank” in names should be controlled 
as far as possible.  
 
Principle 3—Licensing Criteria 
The licensing authority must have the power to set criteria and reject applications for 
establishments that do not meet the standards set. The licensing process, at a minimum, 
should consist of an assessment of the ownership structure and governance of the bank and 
its wider group, including the fitness and propriety of Board members and senior 
management, its strategic and operating plan, internal controls and risk management, and 
its projected financial condition, including its capital base. Where the proposed owner or 
parent organization is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home country supervisor 
should be obtained.  
 
Principle 4—Transfer of Significant Ownership 
The supervisor has the power  to review and reject any proposals to transfer significant 
ownership or controlling interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties.  
 
Principle 5—Major Acquisitions  
The supervisor has the power to review major acquisitions or investments by a bank, against 
prescribed criteria, including the establishment of cross-border operations, and confirming 
that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder 
effective supervision.  
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Principle 6—Capital Adequacy 
Supervisors must set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements for 
banks that reflect the risks that the bank undertakes, and must define the components of 
capital, bearing in mind its ability to absorb losses. At least for internationally active banks, 
these requirements must not be less than those established in the applicable Basel 
requirement.  
 
Principle 7—Risk Management Process 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a 
comprehensive risk management process (including Board and senior management 
oversight) to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or mitigate all material risks,  and to 
assess their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile. These processes should 
be commensurate with the size and complexity of the institution.  
 
Principle 8—Credit Risk 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a credit risk management process that takes 
into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent policies and processes to identify, 
measure, monitor, and control credit risk (including counterparty risk). This would include the 
granting of loans and making of investments, the evaluation of the quality of such loans and 
investments, and the ongoing management of the loan and investment portfolios. 
 
Principle 9—Problem Assets, Provisions, and Reserves 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks establish and adhere to adequate policies and 
processes for managing problem assets and evaluating the adequacy of provisions and 
reserves. 
 
Principle 10—Large Exposure Limits 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have policies and processes that enable 
management to identify and manage concentrations within the portfolio, and supervisors 
must set prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single counterparties or groups of 
connected counterparties.  
 
Principle 11—Exposures to Related Parties 
In order to prevent abuses arising from exposures (both on balance sheet and off balance 
sheet) to related parties and to address conflict of interest, supervisors must have in place 
requirements that banks extend exposures to related companies and individuals on an arm’s 
length basis; these exposures are effectively monitored; appropriate steps are taken to 
control or mitigate the risks; and write-offs of such exposures are made according to 
standard policies and processes. 
 
Principle 12—Country and Transfer Risks 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and processes for 
identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling country risk and transfer risk in their ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
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international lending and investment activities, and for maintaining adequate provisions and 
reserves against such risks.  
 
Principle 13—Market Risks  
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place policies and processes that 
accurately identify, measure, monitor,  and control market risks; supervisors should have 
powers to impose specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on market risk exposures, if 
warranted. 
 
Principle 14—Liquidity Risk 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a liquidity management strategy that takes 
into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent policies and processes to identify, 
measure, monitor, and control liquidity risk, and to manage liquidity on a day-to-day basis. 
Supervisors require banks to have contingency plans for handling liquidity problems.  
 
Principle 15—Operational Risk 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk management policies and 
processes to identify, assess, monitor, and control/mitigate operational risk. These policies 
and processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank. 
 
Principle 16—Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have effective systems in place to identify, 
measure, monitor, and control interest rate risk in the banking book, including a well-defined 
strategy that has been approved by the Board and implemented by senior management; 
these should be appropriate to the size and complexity of such risk.  
 
Principle 17—Internal Control and Audit 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place internal controls that are adequate 
for the size and complexity of their business. These should include clear arrangements for 
delegating authority and responsibility; separation of the functions that involve committing 
the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities; reconciliation of 
these processes; safeguarding the bank’s assets; and appropriate independent internal audit 
and compliance functions to test adherence to these controls as well as applicable laws and 
regulations.  
 
Principle 18—Abuse of Financial Services 
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and processes in place, 
including strict “know-your-customer” rules, that promote high ethical and professional 
standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or 
unintentionally, for criminal activities.  
 
Principle 19—Supervisory Approach 
An effective banking supervisory system requires that supervisors develop and maintain a 
thorough understanding of the operations of individual banks and banking groups, and also ADBI Working Paper 265    Ping 
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of the banking system as a whole, focusing on safety and soundness, and the stability of the 
banking system.  
 
Principle 20—Supervisory Techniques 
An effective banking supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site supervision 
and regular contacts with bank management.  
 
Principle 21—Supervisory Reporting  
Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analyzing prudential reports 
and statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of 
independent verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of 
external experts.  
 
Principle 22—Accounting and Disclosure  
Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in 
accordance with accounting policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally, 
and publishes, on a regular basis, information that fairly reflects its financial condition and 
profitability.  
 
Principle 23—Corrective and Remedial Powers of Supervisors  
Supervisors must have at their disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring 
about timely corrective actions. This includes the ability, where appropriate, to revoke the 
banking license or to recommend its revocation.  
 
Principle 24—Consolidated Supervision  
An essential element of banking supervision is that supervisors supervise the banking group 
on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential 
norms to all aspects of the business conducted by the group worldwide.  
 
Principle 25—Home-Host Relationships 
Cross-border consolidated supervision requires cooperation and information exchange 
between home supervisors and the various other supervisors involved, primarily host 
banking supervisors. Banking supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks 
to be conducted to the same standards as those required of domestic institutions.  
 